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ADMINISTRATIVE ABSOLUTISM
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR.t

A T ITS annual meeting in Cleveland in July, 1938, the American

Bar
Association received from its Special Committee on Administrative
Law the sixth in a series of yearly reports which are coming to assume a
most important place in the current literature on the subject. Apart from
their intrinsic worth (the invariably high professional standing of the
members of the Committee from the time of its creation in 1933 entitles
their utterances to respectful consideration) the reports are significant
documents because of the influence they exert in directing thought in and
about Administrative Law. Not only does the Committee have the direct
audience of some thirty thousand members of the American Bar Association (plus countless others who learn its views, more or less accurately,
through newspaper articles), but it is the only body in America directly
concerned with, and regularly publishing studies on Administrative Law.1
In its current report' (hereinafter referred to as "the Report"), after
making a number of specific recommendations, including those of the
enactment of legislation to forbid the appearance of certain elected officials as advocates before administrative tribunals in certain cases, and of
the enactment of legislation to provide for declaratory judicial pronouncements of the validity of administrative rules and regulations, and of the
encouragement of the teaching of Administrative Law in law schools and
elsewhere, the Committee devotes more than three-fourths of its space to
a "General Report",3 which consists of the most comprehensive appraisal
and the most searching critique of administrative tribunals and their
processes yet made by this body. A lengthy enumeration is made of what
the Committee denominates "Defects of administrative justice against
which safeguards are required, ' 4 followed by, not specific suggestions for
remedies against these defects (for the Committee wisely recognizes that
experience with this form of governmental action has not yet developed
sufficiently to enable us to know the answers in detail), but a statement
of general principles in accordance with which, it is suggested, remedies
may be found.
It is not with the Report's catalog of evils, or with its formal cont Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1. This is not to depredate the activities of the Commonwealth Fund and the seminars
and courses in Administrative Law in many of the law schools. Without pausing now
to evaluate such works as the Harvard Studies in Administrative Law, or those sponsored
by the Commonwealth Fund, I simply make the point that their sphere of influence over
the direction of professional thought is quantitatively much narrower than that of the
Reports of the American Bar Association Committee.
2. AmaicN BAR AssociAno,;, 1938 ADVAcE PROGRAMs, 134-171.
3. Id. at p. 141 et seq.
4. Id. 149-154.
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clusions, by and large, that the present writer is in disagreement. But it
contains undercurrents of thought, questionable postulates and inadequately considered premises of reasoning which, unless care is taken,
will sweep attention away from the larger phases of the problem and concentrate it upon a series of relatively petty issues. An examination of the
basis of reasoning exhibited in the Report may lead to a change of
emphasis in the criticisms leveled at administration and perhaps to
amendment of the Committee's conclusions. It is with this thought in
mind that the present paper is written.
I. Administrative Absolutism
The general tone of the Report, as of its predecessors,' is not indicative
of an excess of sympathy, on the part of the Committee, with administrative tribunals and their processes, or of approval of the place they hold at
present in American jurisprudence. In fact, there is more than a suggestion, throughout the Report, that the activities of administrative agencies
have either brought us, or are bringing us, to a stage of social control
beyond the pale of "jurisprudence" as that term is ordinarily understood.
The complaint is, not the outmoded one that administrative jurisdiction
should not, in the nature of things, and cannot, under the constitution,
exist (the Report admits the fact and the necessity, if not the desirability,
of administration), but that there is a basic fault with numerous attendant
consequences subsumed under the phrase, repeatedly occurring in the
Report: "Administrative Absolutism."
It would be idle, as well as unscholarly, to find fault with the Committee
over a difference of opinion as to the aptitude of a rhetorical expression.
While the phrase, "Administrative Absolutism,"" at once conjures up
visions of Tudor and Stuart excesses and calls into play prejudices born
of emotion and tradition rather than calm, scientific appraisal of legal
and political problems, its use in the Report is not per se objectionable.
What is objectionable are the facts, (1) that the phrase, as used in the
Report, is made to denote a number of different things, some of them
quite irrelevant to the conclusions reached, and, (2) that the phrase, in its
contexts, gives rise to a good many implications of doubtful validity.
The nature of the first objection may be made apparent from a quotation from the Report. In the first place, after rejecting the realistic
definition of "law" as being "whatever is done officially," the Report
5. The earlier reports of the Committee appear in the A.,xNU,
RErons or =n Az tircAN B n AssocrAnos' as follows: (1933) 5S A. B. A. REP. 407; (1934) 59 id.539; (1935)
60 id.136 (an oral report only); (1936) 61 id.720; (1937) 62 id.7M9.

6. The phrase appears to be one coined by Professor Pound, the Chairman of the
Committee, in a paper, The Individualization of Justice (1938) 7 Fonnmxc L. RLv. 154.
The basic thought goes back to his papers on Justice According to Law (1913) 13 Cox.
L. REv. 696; (1914) 14 id.1, 103; and Executive Justice 55 A. L. Rrz. 137.
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adopts the analytic-sociological definition of "law" as being the "body of
authoritative grounds of and guides to decision."7 This definition, as it
has been more fully expounded by the Chairman of the Committee, on
other occasions, may be taken to include authoritative and authoritatively
received precepts, a term which includes standards, principles, rules, and
conceptions . Thus, these severally enumerated guides to decision, as
applied by legally constituted tribunals, may be said to constitute "law"
in the sense in which that term is used in the Report.
Next, the Report proceeds to a definition of "administrative law." In
this definition it includes: "Whatever [administrative] officials, tribunals
and agencies do, whether by way of law making or judging or administering legal precepts or standards in the course of exercising their functions." 9 This, in its context, we may take to be a specific definition of
"administrative law" in the terms of the preceding paragraph substantially as follows: "The body of authoritative standards, principles, rules,
and conceptions, used and usable by administrative tribunals as guides
to decision, plus the technique of courts in supervising such tribunals."
After a definition of terms, the Report introduces its discussion of
"administrative absolutism" by stating: "There may be administration or
administrative determination according to law, or contrary to law or
without law." 10 The inference clearly is that .the epithet is applicable
to either or both of the two latter alternatives.
Continuing, the Report proceeds to insist on "safeguarding individual
interests and preserving the checks and balances involved in the common
law doctrine of the supremacy of law and the constitutional separation
or distribution of powers which is fundamental in our American polity.
What the profession must insist upon is such an adjustment of administrative jurisdiction and practices and determinations to the general law,
and of the doctrines of the general law to the exigencies of effective
administration as will preserve the guaranteed rights of individuals and
yet permit of effective securing of public and social interests."
This series of quotations seems to indicate a confusion of several different things. When the Report defines "law" in a generic sense, and
then speaks of "administration without law," or "contrary to law," the
immediate inference is that it is referring to what the Chairman of the
Committee once aptly described as "Oriental jfistice," a process of determining and adjudicating according to whim and caprice, the system of
"subjective" justice administered by Haroun al Raschid. 1 But, when
7. A. B. A. 1938 ADv. PROGRAM, 143.
8. PouND, OuamUms OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) 48; Pound, The Tleory
of Judicial Decision (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 641, 643-653.
9. A. B. A. 1938 ADV. PROGRA, 145.

10. Ibid.
11.

Pound, Justice According to Law (1913)

13 COL. L. REv. 696, 697.
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detailed discussion of "administrative absolutism" is entered into, we find
that the need is not so much of the conformity of administration to "law,"
as of its adjustment to the "general law." This is something else again.
The latter term is nowhere defined in the Report. It is not likely that it
is the ghost of Swift v. Tyson, " so recently annihilated.
Yet it is hard
to read "general law" as meaning anything other than "common law" in
one of the many senses in which that much-abused expression is used. 4
With such an understanding, administration without, or contrary to,
"law" may be, and probably is, an entirely different thing from administration without, or contrary to the "general," or "common" law.
To put the matter concretely, no court of competent jurisdiction would
hesitate, in a proper case, to "administer" the Alien Contract Labor Act.1 5
Nor in administering it would it be accused of administering "justice
without law." Yet it would be applying a precept wholly foreign to all
the substantive rules and received ideals of the common law system.'
Everything in common law history, from the Statute of Laborers down,
shrieks that there is no limitation upon the right of the employer to hire
his hands, save that he must not steal another employer's contract servant.
Consider, too, the application of the Mann Act17 in Carnnettiv. United
States." There was justice contrary to the common law,' 9 but certainly
not justice without law. Going over to the procedural side, it is unquestionable that the State of California tried Hurtado -0 not according
to the common law when it dispensed with a grand jury indictment for
murder, but when he was hanged (as presumably he was) the official
action was not "justice without law."
What has been said has been offered, not as a quibble or as a play upon
words, but in order to emphasize the need of clarity in defining the issues
to be discussed. It is one thing to apply the epithet "administrative
absolutism" to the ideas of those who envision social control through the
unsupervised decrees of a body of wizards, but quite another thing to
speak in the same terms of a system of regulation by executive officials
according to more or less definitely expressed legislative standards and
subject to a greater or less degree of judicial control. Theoretically, there
is a point at which the latter shades off into the former, but, assuming the
12. 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
13. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
14. Riddell, Correction of Erroneous Verdicts (1929) 17 GEo. L. J. 323 (1929).
15. 23 STAT. 332 (1885); 39 STAT. 875 (1917), 8 U. S. C. 136 (h) (1927); 39 id. 879,
S U. S. C. 139 (1927); 23 id. 566 (1885), 8 U. S. C. 141 (1927).
16. Compare the understatement of Brown, J., in United States v. Craig, 28 Fed.
795, 798 (1886).
17. 36 STAT. 825 (1910), 18 U. S. C. 397-404.

18. 242 U. S. 470 (1917).
19. Mx= CRnmYi LAw (1934) 432 and authorities there collected.
20. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
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incompatability of the "wizard" theory of jurisprudence with democratic
ideals, it would seem more profitable to recognize a distinction between
the two than to tar the entire administrative process with the brush of an
opprobrious name. This done, discussion could proceed temperately to
determine the need and the availability of ways and means of improving
the process. The problem could be reduced to one of degree rather than
kind. Once recognize that administration according to standards is
administration according to "law" (at least of a sort), we can formulate
and discuss the juristic issue as to the qualitative and quantitative content
of the "law" which should govern administrative action.
Before further development of this theme, it will be well to return to
the second objection to the use of the expression "administrative absolutism." This, it will be remembered, is the questionable implications of the
term. The first of these is involved in the definition of "law" already set
forth as the authoritative body of guides to decision. As has also been
seen, the analysis of the leading exponent of this definition makes a fourfold classification of these guides into standards, principles, rules, and
conceptions. The thought is continually suggested, although nowhere
expressly stated, that unless all of these elements, notably the third, are
present, the guide to decision, whatever else it may be, is not "law. '2 1
The invalidity of such a generalization can be made to appear from a
single example. Courts, in administering the due process clauses of constitutions, have, in the last analysis, only a standard as a guide to
decision. It is well known that they have definitely and constantly refused to define due process by anything in the nature of a rule. Yet it is
traditional to speak of constitutions and constitutional decisions as "law."
The questionable implications referred to may be reduced to two, one
of doctrine and the other of fact. The Man from Mars, upon reading the
Report, would be led to infer, (1) that the natures of our system of law
and of our public problems are such that a rule or precept, as distinct
from a mere standard, can be framed to govern every situation selected for
regulation, but (2) that in fact all, or a great majority of our administrative tribunals exercise all their fufictions under the guidance of no rule
at all, but in accordance with a nearly absolute discretion.
The first of these propositions springs from the natural instinct for
security which is thought to flow from certainty and predictability, and
reflects the juristic concepts of the great majority of the legal profession
who idealize "law" in terms of the Blackstonian pronouncement that it is
a "rule of action.1 22

The facts of civilization, however, keep such an

21. A. B. A. 1938 ADv. PROGRAM, 159-160: "The type of the administrative process Is
a dealing with a unique situation on its own special circumstances without attempt to refer
the situation to a general principle or formulate in the course of disposing of it a precept
for like cases in the future."
22.

1 BL. Comm. *38.
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ideal from complete realization. Once we accept the fact that there is,
and will continue to be extensive governmental regulation of private
activities, we are forced to recognize that, in certain of its phases, such
regulation can be accomplished only by the application of standards.
This matter was well put in an address to his professional brethren by the
general counsel of one of the great railroads.? The speaker told of a
conversation with a former Interstate Commerce Commissioner in which
the ex-official was asked to describe his mental processes in making rates.
The answer was, simply, "I just made them." This is the sort of thing
which Mr. Justice Holmes once described as, "an intuition of experience
which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions; impressions which may lie beneath consciousness without losing
their worth."2' 4 Whether a rate is just and reasonable, or whether a trade
practice is consistent with the public interest, are questions which cannot
be answered by formulae.
Moreover, it must be remembered that this process of what Mr. Justice
Holmes on another occasion described as, "decision [dependent] on a
judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise,"'
is not the whole of any administrative process. The Statutes-at-Large and
the Federal Register are full of rules and regulations imposing limitations,
substantive and procedural, upon administrative action. It is a commonplace that the terms of a pertinent statute control administrative action,2
even where technical competence is involved.2 7 Again, although the
Interstate Commerce Commission has a certain amount of discretionary
power in prescribing rates, once the power is exercised, the rate prescribed
is binding upon the Commission as well as upon the carriers affected.
And, even where courts refer to administrative exercise of discretionary
power as "conclusive," it may be noted that such exercise of power is
ordinarily preceded by a hearing of some sort and may be followed by
some amount of judicial review."
From these considerations, it appears that the topic for discussion
should be, not whether administration should be allowed to run at large,
but whether the proper restraints exist to prevent it from running at
large; not whether administrative discretion should be tolerated as such,
but whether discretion is wisely given or withheld in particular cases;
not whether standards alone are proper guides to decision, but whether in
particular cases it is possible or desirable to supplement standards by
principles and rules.
Bikle, Adinistrative Discretion (1933) 2 Gao. WASh. L. RaY. 1.
24. See Chicago, B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585, 59S (1907).
25. See Lochner v. New York, 193 U. S. 45, 76 (1905).
26. Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 5.,0 (1930).
23.

27. Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606 (1918).
28. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 284 U. S. 370 (1932).
see Note (1936) 34 Mmca. L. Rr. 672.
29. See Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297 (1937).

And
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Separation of Powers

More than once in the Report 0 the implication is made that the growth
of administrative jurisdiction is repugnant to a constitutional precept
relating to separation or distribution of the powers of government. This
thought introduces a wholly extraneous issue, and, were it not for the fact
that it reflects *awidely prevalent state of mind in the profession, it might
well be dismissed with the observation that the courts have generally been
competent to deal with excesses of constitutional power.
Lawyers and political scientists have been slow to appreciate the distinction between what may be called the political doctrine of separation of
powers and the constitutional or legal doctrine. 3' The former is an ideal
indicative generally of the form of good government. The latter is a
precept, giving definite content to the ideal for purposes of its specific
application. As an ideal, the doctrine of separation of powers has no
efficacy in the machinery ofsocial control except insofar as the accepted
political and social standards of the time and place are influential in determining the construction of statutes or the exposition of constitutional
provisions.3 2 To the extent that it has been made a constitutional precept,
the ,doctrine has the force of law and of course controls the decision of
appropriate cases.
In American public law there is an important relation between these
two doctrines of separation of powers. There is more than jest in the
trite saying, "The Constitution means what the judges say it means." It
is a corrolary of the accepted doctrine of judicial supremacy that provisions of the Constitution, especially those found there by implication
only, have no finally authoritative meaning until defined by the courts.
We can, then, learn to what extent there is a constitutional precept of
separation of powers only by inquiring to what extent the courts have
decided that there is. And when we inquire, we find that the judicial
evolution of the doctrine is not a process of application of analytical concepts or of postulating a pre-existing scheme into which all governmental
phenomena must fit, but rather a course of sanctioning contemporary
ideals either as evidenced by established executive and legislative practices,3 3 or as intuitively sensed 4
30. A. B. A., 1938 ADV. PROGRA, 145, 155.
31. See O'Reilly, The Proposed Federal Administrative Court (1937) 6 FoRD-AM L.
REv. 365, 370.
32. This influence is frequently not inconsiderable. See Finkleman, Separation of
Powers, 1 UNIv. op ToaoN'bo L. J. 313.
33. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52
(1926); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927).
34. E.g., the ideal of the limitation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Hayburn's
Case, 2 Dal]. 408 (1792); Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697 (1864); Keller v.
Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428 (1923).
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The constitutional doctrine of separation of po'ers, as evolved to date,
has imposed relatively few limitations upon the power of the federal
legislature to provide for the conduct of the government., It may well
be that the framers bf the Constitution, influenced as they no doubt were
by the writings of Montesquieu, had some thought of prescribing the
trichotomy of governmental functions envisaged by the great Frenchman
as a part of the basic law they were making. But, in the eyes of James
Madison, one of the first constitutional commentators,," they did not
accept the details of Montesquieu's doctrine as such, but stopped at
translating into a legal standard the political ideal (which stood behind
Montesquieu) of preventing undue concentration of governmental power
in the hands of a single individual or group. It may be that in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when government was still in a
state of relative simplicity, the strict separation of powers which
Montesquieu advocated would have been a convenient rule to implement
this ideal. But the fact is that, although most of the thinking about
separation of powers has been along the lines of Montesquieu's thesis,
that thesis as a whole has never been crystallized into legal precept. It
has been legalized in certain technical connections, such as the limitations
upon the jurisdiction of the federal courts,"' and latterly, the matter of
excessive delegation of legislative power3 s But on the other hand, even
in the days of governmental simplicity, there were lacunae in, and overlappings of executive, legislative, and judicial powers and functions. Of
these the courts were sometimes conscious, 39 sometimes unaware.04 But
in all cases where a strict separation of powers was found inadequate for
the real or apparent necessities of governmental functioning, there was
tacit acquiescence in departure from it,41 although to be sure there were
ingenious protestations that in each case there was in reality no departure.
In recent years, however, after the way was opened by Chief Justice
Taft,' who had been an executive and an administrator as well as a
lawyer and judge, there was open admission that strict separation of
powers was being departed from, and validly s0' This view was ex35. See cases in note 34, supra; also Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 3S9
(1935); Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); cf. Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 1S9 (1928).
36. Tim FEDERALisT, xlvii. The pertinent language is quoted in O'Reilly, note 31, supra
at 369.
37. See cases note 34, supra.
38. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 389 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
39. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (1825).
40. Cargo of the Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 382 (1813).
41. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904);
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1911).
42. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
43. See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 305 (1933).
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pounded even in an era which saw separation of powers as a legal
institution given its widest application."
In the past thirty years the functions and activities of government have
become more numerous and more complex than formerly. The result is
that lacunae, overlappings, and other phenomena leading to departure
from a strict separation of powers have become more numerous. It is
quesdonable reasoning which is based upon the assumption that Montesquieu's political ideal is any longer (if it ever was) a trustworthy guide
in determining whether governmental power is being legally exercised.
And when the Report speaks of "the constitutional separation or distribution of powers which is fundamental in our American polity,""4 it makes
just such an assumption. It were more profitable, if the Committee desires
to talk about separation of powers, to speak in the language of Madison;
to discuss whether or not administration is too centralized; to ascertain
whether there are too many or too few departments, bureaus, boards, and
commissions; but above all, to recognize that when they talk about this
matter, the issue is one of policy, not of law, and the problem is one of
expediency, not of constitutional limitations.
111. Judicial Review
Of a kind with its treatment of separation of powers is the Report's
advocacy of judicial review as a means of restraint upon administrative
action. Its function, one gathers, is the preservation of "the caecks and
balances involved in the common law doctrine of the supremacy of law."'
This statement, which colors the tone of the whole Report, is a glittering
generality which adds nothing to the store of human knowledge. Unless
the Committee is setting up a man of straw to be pushed over by ponderous
argument, it will find little dispute as to the need of checks upon administrative action generally. On the other hand, that the checks should
be those involved in the common law doctrine referred to is a statement
of doubtful meaning as well as of questionable validity.
The common law doctrine of the supremacy of law may be taken to be
identical" with the "Rule of Law" popularized by the late Professor Dicey
in his treatise on the English Constitution.4" Both the existence and the
legitimacy of this offspring of the Anglo-American tradition of judicial
supremacy are dubious. Neither the "law of the land" of Magna Carta
nor the "due process of law" of the Constitution perpetuated the common
law or any or all of its processes.4 9 The picture of the corner policeman
44.
45.
46.
47.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
A. B. A. 1938 ADV. PROGRAM 145.
Ibid.
Pound, Ridea of Law, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF = Socmx SCIWCEcS, 463.

48.

Dic y, LAW OF T

CONSTiTUTioN (8th ed.)

183.

49. Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 235 (1845); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How.
272 (1855).
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and the plumbing inspector being subject to the same action for excesses
of official power as is the private citizen who commits similar torts is a
strikingly dramatic one, but seldom is its prototype found in real life.
In Great Britain misconduct of an officer is traditionally followed by an
inquiry in the House of Commons and an explanation or an apology by the
appropriate minister. In this country, if the wrong is serious enough, there
are editorials about it in the newspapers. But in either country, those
close to the courts know that damages are rarely sought against public
officers for wrongs committed by them in the course of duty save where the
public authority has adopted the practice of satisfying judgments rendered
against its servants.
What the expositors of the "Rule of Law" have observed but failed
adequately to analyze is the breakdown of the doctrine of the immunity
of the sovereign from suit. There is no doubt that the courts have been
the prime movers in this breakdown. Influenced in part by distrust of
administrative action, and in part by jealous zeal for the preservation of
their own jurisdiction, they invented and applied common law curbs,
0
usually in the form of the so-called extraordinary writs, to administration.Y
The net result of such procedure was to invite legislation which, while
it formally surrendered the position of immunity of the government from
suit, placed (or attempted to place) drastic limitations upon the power
of the courts to control administration. Provisions for conclusiveness of
administrative action, for postponement of judicial action until after the
completion of the administrative process, for the substitution of statutory
for common law procedures, and a host of others were designed to cut
down what was felt to be judicial "interference" in administration.
What is needed now is the development of an enlightened technique
of review of administrative action. It is a shortsighted view which sees the
issue as a contest between the advocates of review and those of nonreview. The real need is of a survey to restate the nature and function of
review (whether judicial, or administrative, or both) of administrative
action, to determine the appropriateness and the scope of review in particular classes of cases, and to consolidate existing procedures (or invent
new ones) for the conduct of such review. Administrative agencies have
become definitely established institutions in the framework of modem
government and it is hopeless to attempt to spell out their relation to the
ordinary courts on the same basis as if they were strange and temporary
phenomena. On the other hand, each administrative agency has its own
individuality and it would be futile to attempt to work out the relation
between the courts and all such agencies in terms of the same formula.
The need of simplification of the modes of review is adverted to in the
Report 1
50. The history of this has been well summarized in the Report. A. B. A. 1938 ADv.
PRo3A

155-157.

51. Id. 162.
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There is no unity of opinion as to what is, at the present day, the proper
function of courts in reviewing administrative action. One school of
thought, patently influenced by the distrust of administration already
mentioned, conceives that, so far as possible, the courts should see to it
that the administrative tribunal reaches the "right" result. 2 One State
has gone so far as to write this principle into the proposed revision of its
constitution.' Another school of thought would limit judicial supervision
to determining not whether the administrative properly disposed of the
matter upon its merits, but rather whether the process used was one
calculated to lead to the right result." Another view that has been expressed envisions the courts as the supervisors of an evolution of administration into an effective and orderly instrumentality of justice. 5
Thus, we find an experienced administrator using this language:"'
"These temporary defeats really strengthened the administrative bodies, for at
early stages in their history they were shown pitfalls to be avoided and were
guided along sounder lines than they, in their pioneering efforts, were following.
There is no doubt of the profound effect of these early decisions in shaping the
course of administrative justice, both State and Federal, and in determining the
form and scope of subsequent legislation."
Again, there is no uniformity of view as to what standards should be
held up to administrative bodies by the reviewing courts. It is admitted
on all sides that when a hearing is called for by either the statute or the
constitution, administrative action without a hearing is void. But what
constitutes a "hearing"? Sometimes an administrative proceeding complies with the requirement when it approximates the form of a hearing
before a legislative committee. 7 At other times, a hearing is inadequate
because it does not approximate traditional judicial procedure.5s Or, take
the matter of findings. It is sometimes held that administrative action
must be accompanied by findings whether the statute so provides or not.59
At other times, there need be no finding unless the statute demands one."0
And where the statute prescribes findings, how definite need the "findings"
52.

Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920); Crowell v.

Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932); St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38
(1936).
53. Proposed N. Y. Constitution, Judiciary Article, No. 25 (1938).
54. Dickinson, Administrative Law and the Fear of Bureaucracy (1928) 14 A. B. A. 3.
513, 597.
55. Oppenheimer, The Supreme Court and Administrative Law (1937) 37 COL. L. Rav. 1.
56. Atchison, Justice Holmes and the Development of Administrative Law (1933) 1
GEo.

WAsH. L. REv. 165, 170.

57. Norwegian Nitrogen Products v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933).
58. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936), rehearing denied 304 U. S. 1 (1938).
59. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 389 (1935).

60. Pacific States Box Co. v. White, 296 U. S.176 (1935).
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be? In the cases of a deportation order"' or an executive embargo on the
shipment of military supplies, 2 a finding in the terms of the statute will
suffice; but in the cases of federal regulation of intrastate railroad ratesc
or the granting and denying of radio licenses,4 the findings must be more
elaborate. It is true that some part of the discord in these and other
decisions is attributable (and properly so) to differences in the subjectmatters of regulation and in the traditional procedures of the tribunals
involved. But there is no evidence that the courts are conscious of this
sort of thing as they decide the cases, or that the process is carried on
according to any design. The inference that immediately occurs to one
who has read and compared these cases is that the courts, still unconvinced
that administration in its present stage of development is capable of doing
its job properly, are groping about almost blindly, seeking some device to
keep control of a process all of whose implications they cannot see; a
process which is for that reason alone, they think, pregnant with danger
to the future commonweal.
This largely subconscious technique is a factor of prime importance in
any evaluation of judicial review. Most discussions of the topic assume
that review consists of applying an objective test, the "pure fact of law,"
to administrative action ih,
order to test its legality. The fact is almost
invariably overlooked that judges, in many of their public law decisions,
are policymakers and statesmen, not mere mouthers of rules. It was not
a difference of opinion over a petty legalism in the Charles River Bridge
case'5 that made Story differ with Taney and led the former to a most
unjudicial exchange of letters with Chancellor Kent in which both parties
freely predicted the end of the Constitution."0 The issue decided there
was whether the ideal of Marshall's generation, sanctity of contract, should
yield to an upstart, the police power of the state. Not all the cases assume
the proportions of this one but in a good many of them the judges do the
same sort of thing that Taney and Story did there. The difference is one
of degree: the results of the other cases may not be so important but the
substance and method are the same. But unless account is taken of this
factor in judicial review and steps taken to regulate it, the cumulative
results of a number of cases may become very important. Complaints
are being heard that judges are carrying the technique of judicial statesmanship to excess. It is alleged that under the forms of interpretation of
statutes and inquiry into the administrative application of legal standards,
61. Alab er v. Eby, 264 U.,S. 32 (1924).
62. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1937).
63. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 (1932).
64. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commis-ion, 96 F. (2d'
554 (App. D. C. 1938).
65. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (1837).
66. WAALrxn, SuPBEmE CouRT N U IrrD SrArns HisTony, I, 28-32.
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often highly technical in their nature and with objectives and methods
with which the courts are not at all familiar, the judges are frustrating
many pieces of social legislation.67 The result is a cry for the establishment of a system of administrative courts.
It is not necessary to be in agreement on the solution in order to agree
that there is a problem and enough has been said to indicate that a problem
exists. Already the precedents are in such confusion that the process of
judicial review is perhaps more chaos than law. We have watched the
systems of common law and of equity grow up' in a haphazard, unregulated
sort of way, so that they now stand in need of Restatement and we have
seen crystallized in them, beyond even the control of a Restatement,
doctrines and rules which we could wish were not there. It is time to take
profit from experience and to make an attempt to save Administrative
Law from the fate which overtook the private law. This is not a suggestion that techniques can be developed in a day or a year or that there
is an adequate substitute for experience and the passage of time. But
it is a suggestion that enlightened study and a sympathetic approach may
enable us to develop long range objectives and to guide the evolution of
this growing process along lines best calculated to gain the ever-present
goal of a proper adjustment of the competing claims of individual rights
and of social interests. Here is a reform, or rather, insurance against
the need of reform which a committee of the American Bar Association
could well undertake, and, by reason of its widespread influence bring well
along the road to realization.
IV. Specific Problems
It would be a mistake to think that revision of the process of judicial
review could be effected by direct methods. It is conceivable that a
procedural statute could be enacted either abolishing or cutting down to
a minimum the jurisdiction of courts to review administrative action. But
that, like the opposite extreme, giving courts plenary jurisdiction to review,
is not what seems to be needed. And it goes without saying that no code
of procedure can create a judicial technique. The first need is of a recasting of the general background against which judicial review operates,
so that the way may be paved for whatever reform then appears necessary.
The beginning of such a recasting should be made within the ranks of
the legal profession. It is customary for critics of judicial review as it is
now practiced to put most of the blame for the shortcomings of the system
on the judges who preside over the courts. The inference is made, or
sometimes the proposition is baldly stated, that judges are innately reactionary, that they are so influenced by their conservative personal and
professional associations that they deliberately set their faces against
67.
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anything smacking of liberalism. This is a most distorted picture. While
it is undoubtedly true that the personal equation does not disappear upon
elevation to the bench, history gives us innumerable judges who refused to
let the viewpoints of clients whom they formerly served control their judicial decisions. A recent biography 8 calls to mind Waite the one-time railroad attorney who decided M2inn v. Illinois.0 And there are scores, if not
hundreds like him who might also be listed. Yet there is a ray of accuracy
in the picture just described. Judges do, very frequently, incline against
accepting or giving a liberal interpretation to new social legislation.
The articles of Messrs. Gordon and Jennings ° document the thesis that
a good deal of legislation has suffered needless emasculation through strict
statutory interpretation. The English instances cited by them could
easily be duplicated in America. The explanation offered is that the
English judges did not fully understand the objectives and the social
implications of the legislation with which they were dealing and therefore
refused to give the administrators of the statutes carte blanche to do
things the consequences of which the judges could not foresee. The
validity of this concept may be argued from observation of a case where
the result was the reverse. In the Wagner Act cases71 the court, in order
to sustain the legislation, made an interpretation of the commerce clause
which is generally believed7 - to be the direct contrary of one of its own
recent and rather vehement decisions.' There is a school of thought
which finds the explanation of this sudden reversal of opinion in the excellent arguments of government counsel in the cases. 74
If the major premise is acceptable, there is abundance of proof at least
a prioriof the minor, that counsel do not, in fact, perform adequately their
function of informing the courts of the issues in and beneath the cases.7a
One who spends considerable time as a detached observer listening to
arguments in a state supreme court and reading briefs ified in cases in that
court cannot help but get a definite impression of the mediocrity of the
bar as a whole in most matters and of the utter incompetency of the rank
and file in public law litigation. The cause of this deficiency is twofold.
It is to be found in the education and the experience (or rather, in the
68. TR
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71. N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937); N. L. R. B.
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lack of these factors) of the average member of the bar. Until late years,
most law schools saw no necessity of giving their students more than a
suggestion of training in the public law field, and even today, many of them
devote the smallest possible part of the curriculum to these subjects.
Again, it is still true that, even in the present era of broadening of the scope
of governmental activity, the great bulk of the average lawyer's practice is
in private law. The result is that when a case for litigation against the
government comes into the office, the attorney, never well grounded in
public law, attempts to learn the pertinent doctrine overnight and proceeds
to trial and argument utterly deficient in and ignorant of the subtle background of technique by which the doctrines were evolved and in accordance
with which decisions are made. Nor are these deficiencies found alone
in the ranks of private practitioners. They are present, only to a more
limited extent, among those who serve the government. Political appointments, frequent turnover, low salaries, inadequately-manned staffs are
factors which make for poorly-presented cases on this side.
The remedy, it is clear, is education. The Committee has made a step
in the right direction in recommending that the law schools and the bar
associations do something about training men to appear before administrative tribunals and to become administrative officials. The thought advanced here is that the recommendation be given wider scope and be made
to provide that all lawyers be encouraged to familiarize themselves with
administrative law and its processes.
Another part of the general background which stands in need of correction is what may be called the problem of administrative personnel.
Incompetence, indifference, and venality are all to prevalent in the administrative departments of all our governments. Dickinson has traced
out the relation between this fact and the distrust in which courts hold
most administrative processes."6 He argues that the problem is a political
one and suggests that if the courts in their review of administrative action
would refuse to correct errors actually or presumably attributable to incompetence and dishonesty, there would soon enough be sufficient pressure
brought for the creation of new and effective political controls of the
problem of personnel. This line of argument depicts fairly enough the
courts' self-portrait of a divinely-appointed mission to save the world from
the wrongs of poor executives and contrasts strangely with judicial unwillingness to question the wisdom of legislatures but the conclusion
reached is too far contrary to accepted tradition to have much hope of
realization.
Any project of restatement of the technique of judicial review must
seriously consider this problem. The task is largely one of the development of a convincing tradition of efficiency and accomplishment. The
76.

See note 54, supra.

19381

ADMINISTRATIVE ABSOLUTISM

nearest approach, if not the realization of this, has been in the Interstate
Commerce Commission. A fitting subject for research and experiment
would be to see how that Commission's plan of separation of function and
co-ordination of activities could be translated so as to serve the needs of
other agencies. 77 Not to be ignored, yet not to be cavalierly seized upon
as an answer, is the question as to how far extension of a "career system"
of classified civil service will go to meet the difficulty. 78 The problem is
one to which almost no systematic thought has been given by lawyers but
the solution, if one is found, will go as far as anything towards earning
for Administrative Law full recognition as a branch of "law." It is no
answer to say79 that the ideal of a body of experts is seldom realized in
the actual practice of government and to concludeP0 that our only recourse
is more judicial supervision. At least there should be inquiry to ascertain
whether there are means available of accomplishing the ideal.
A third line of potentially fruitful inquiry is one which has been almost
completely lost sight of in current thinking about Administrative Law.
This has to do with the need of developing a critique of legislation.
As has been suggested above, the traditional habit of professional
thought is to impute to the courts an infinite amount of wisdom and to
indulge the trust that they can and will, by virtue of this wisdom, provide
protection against executive abuses. Apart from the fact that this line
of thought places undue emphasis upon the securing of individual interests
to the exclusion of consideration of social interests and assuming that the
thought has a substantial basis in fact, there are two objections to making
it a guide in the conduct of public affairs. First, with the increase in the
number and scope of administrative activities and the constant tendency
to limit the jurisdiction of courts to review these activities, it is doubtful
whether judicial review can much longer remain an adequate check upon
the administrative. 8 ' Second, to look solely to the courts for relief, overlooking the possibilities of developing effective responsibility in the coordinate departments of government is a shameful disregard of sound
principles of division of labor.
A great deal can be accomplished in these directions by means of legislation. Matters of inner administrative organization and procedure and
of "apportionment of authority between the judicial and the administrative processes"" as well as matters of broad general policy are properly
the care of the statute-making body.
Paocss, 103-10s, as to the Securities
77. Cf. LAmis, THE Anmasnism%
Exchange Commission.
78. See Mlorford, Adrninistratftve Boards and Agenckes (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 99.
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The need of legislative attention to these matters of detail is strikingly
illustrated by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Kansas City
Stockyards case.83 That was a proceeding under the Packers and Stockyards Act in which the Secretary of Agriculture sought to exercise his
statutory power to prescribe rates. There was an elaborate hearing before
a trial examiner at which some 10,000 typewritten pages of testimony
were taken and some 1000 pages of exhibits and statistics received. The
proceeding was then moved to the office of the Secretary, where oral
arguments were made before an Assistant Secretary of the Department
and written briefs were filed. A rate order was then issued over the
signature of the Secretary. The market operators filed a bill in equity
in the district court to restrain the enforcement of the rate order. This
suit has twice been brought up to the Supreme Court of the United States
of the proand at the present writing (over six years after the institution
84
ceedings) a final decision on the merits is yet to be reached.
The original bill was dismissed after the district court struck out an
allegation, upon information and'belief, that the Secretary of Agriculture
had not accorded the petitioners the "full hearing" required by the Act,
in that he had not personally, before signing the rate order, read the
testimony or the arguments of counsel. The supreme court reversed, holding that the allegation was properly in the bill, and that the statute requiring a "full hearing" was not satisfied where the officer making the
decision was not familiar with the record upon which the decision was
presumably based. After the remand to the district court, the Secretary
responded to interrogatories. He testified that he had read the written
briefs and the transcript of the oral argument (which had been held before
his assistant) and had "dipped into the record from time to time to get
its drift." Employes of the Bureau of Animal Industry had digested the
record and prepared findings which were submitted to the Secretary but
were not shown to the market operators. The rate order, the Secretary
concluded, was his independent conclusion "as based on the findings of the
men in the Bureau of Animal Industry." The district court again dismissed the bill, but again the supreme court reversed, holding that the
procedure revealed in the responses to the interrogatories did not amount
to the "full hearing" required by the statute. The keynote of the decision
is found in the following language of the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes:
"Congress, in requiring a 'full hearing' had regard to judicial standards-not
in any technical sense but with respect to those fundamental requirements of
fairness which are of the essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial

nature.... The requirements of fairness are not exhausted in the taking or con83. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936), 304 U. S. 1 (1938).
84. The New York Times, September 1, 1938, carried a dispatch stating that new
administrative hearings were planned in the case.
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sideration of evidence, but extend to the concluding parts of the procedure as
well as to the beginning and intermediate steps.
"... In all substantial respects, the Government acting through the Bureau
of Animal Industry of the Department was prosecuting the proceedings against
the owners of the market agencies....
" . . . What would not be essential to the adequacy of the hearing if the
Secretary himself makes the findings is not a criterion for a case in which the
Secretary accepts and makes as his own the finding which have been prepared by
the active prosecutors for the Government, after an ex parte discussion with
them and without according any reasonable opportunity to the respondents in
the proceeding to know the claims thus presented and to contest them. That is
more than an irregularity in practice; it is a vital defect."
Despite the appearance in the opinion of the phrase "due process," it
seems clear enough that the decision is based not upon any constitutional
limitations on the power of Congress to prescribe a form of procedure, but
upon the view that there was not administrative compliance with the
statutory requirements. The court applied the fair presumption that when
Congress directed that a hearing be held, it intended that there should
be a proceeding characterized by the elements of "fair play." In applying
the presumption the court relied upon the generally correct proposition
that fair play is probably wanting when the adjudicating officer consults
ex parte with one of the interested parties. An essential factor in the
court's application of this proposition in the Morgan case was the "interest" of the employes in the Bureau of Animal Industry. On this point,
it is interesting to compare a statement by the Secretary of Agriculture
on the decision:"5
"The men of the Bureau of Animal Industry were of very real assistance to
me in digesting the 10,000 pages of oral transcript and studying carefully the
1,000 pages of statistical exhibits. It was right that I should rely on them, because these men were employed among other things for just such a purpose. They
were not the active prosecutors in the case, as has been assumed."
It is not the purpose here to discuss the question whether the Secretary
or the Chief Justice was right on the question of fact. It is quite possible
that each was right. It may well be that the court believed that secret
consultation with any employe of the Department after argument was
a departure by the Secretary from his statutory duty of conducting a "full
hearing." The point to be made here is that a careful phrasing of the
statute could have eliminated any need for the court speculating as to the
exact degree of "interested" ex parte advice Congress "intended" to exclude from the concept of fair play.
We have become accustomed, in the conduct of our affairs, to seize upon
s5. Letter of Henry A. Wallace to the editor of the New York Times, May 8, 1935.
See also letter of Frederick H. Wood (counsel for the market op nators), id. Mfay 15, 193S.
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various shibboleths86 for guidance. Thus, "consideration" is still the
shibboleth of the commercial lawyer, although the doctrine of promissory
estoppel has all but robbed that term of significance. In the political
world, "Republican" and "Democrat" are still the words which induce the
marking of ballots. Likewise, in the field of public law, "hearing" is the
shibboleth of the legislator and the judge. Statutes are thought to provide
due process of law when they direct that a "hearing" shall be held before
adjudication. Sometimes, indeed, the legislature fails to order a hearing
as an adjunct to an important phase of administrative action, but apparently leaves it to the administrative officers to set up for themselves
the proper safeguards.8 7 Usually, the legislature considers its work done
when it enacts that there shall be a hearing, not pausing to consider what
should be done about the fact that a hearing may be so perfunctory, or
conducted under such circumstances, or by such officers as not to amount
to any restriction upon administrative action.
The task of a legislature in this connection is not to set up a rigid code
of administrative procedure such as will hamstring administrative officers
and deprive them of all discretion, or will cast all administrative procedures in the same mold. The task is to set up minimum standards of
conduct for administrative officers (not necessarily the same standards for
all officers) by way of elaboration of the general directions contained in
the statutes for the conduct of the public business. For instance, to pursue
the theme suggested by the Morgan case, Congress might well consider
whether in the administration of the Packers and Stockyards Act there
should be a "proposed report" procedure, modelled after that of the Interstate Commerce Commission 8s by which a trial examiner, after hearing,
submits tentative findings and order, upon which argument is had and
which serve as the basis of decision in the particular case. Whether the
conclusion reached is in the affirmative or the negative, similar but separate consideration should be given to the question of the desirability and
the practicability of applying like procedure in different functions of
this and the other departments of the government.
A technique of approach to the problem of developing a critique of
legislation is being worked out by a number of distinguished scholars. The
late Gerard Henderson, for example, pointed out the dangers inherent in
86. "Shibboleth: 1. Bib. The word by which Gileadite (Galaadites) distinguished the
fugitive Ephraimites, who pronounced it sibboleth." Webster's Dictionary.
87. PATIRrsox, TnE I~suRAxcE Colmssiozmx
=x UN=rr
STATES, ch. 6, enumerates
a long list of legislative failures to provide proper procedural safeguards against administrative abuses.
88. I. C. C. Rules of Practice, XIV; SHirmAN, THE INTERSTATE CovMMca CommflssIozz, ch. 4, p. 227 et seq. Such a procedure is in fact in operation under
the Packers and Stockyards Act by rule of the Department of Agriculture. The rule was
adopted after the Kansas City Stockyards proceeding was begun. See Mr. Wallace's
letter, note 85, supra.
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the Federal Trade Commission's institution of "revolving" panels of trial
examiners and prosecutors. The tendency, he pointed out, was for the
prosecutors to dictate findings which the trial examiners signed and submitted to the Commission.O Van Vleck makes pointed criticism of the
statutes which allocate the function of trying deportation cases to administrative tribunals rather than to courts." Landis points out the desirability of requiring some administrative tribunals to write opinions articulating
the reasons for their decisions.01 Dodd has called attention to the usefulness of provision for administrative review of certain kinds of administrative action." Thus, the trail has been blazed. What remains, is first
a process of expansion and consolidation. Research into the nature and
function of the various institutions of state and national governments,
along the lines indicated by Patterson and Sharfman, should be encouraged, and from these researches efforts should be made to extract general
principles of either universal or particular application.
The method of administrative law need not be essentially different from
that of the physical sciences. It is ideally the inductive one of translating
the facts of experience into general principles governing future action,
rather than deducing rules of action from generalities postulated a priori.
To cite a rough analogy: the automobile industry of today is the product
of an evolution covering many years. But the evolution was a controlled
one. The producers placed the first crude "gasoline buggies" on the roads
and then, partly through laboratory research, but chiefly through critical
observation of the machines in actual operation, they have been able to
preserve merits and eliminate defects, and finally to manufacture the
streamlined approaches to mechanical perfection which transport the
population of today. Administrative law, older than many of the physical
industries, is still in a stage of underdeveloped adolescence. It has gathered a wealth of experience, but too little effort has been made to elucidate
and coordinate this experience for purposes of improving the process. The
scientific method of improving administration need not be limited to details
of procedure but is adapted as well to matters of substance. Although it
is true that, "modern legislators, if they are to carry on the functions of
democracy, cannot become tea tasters," 3 it is quite possible that vague
and elusive standards governing administrative action, unavoidable at
the outset of an experiment in public regulation, may in many cases be
capable of clarification and definition as a result of experience in the
particular type of regulation.
89. HmDrmsoN,, TnE FEDmz Tmn Com.=nssioa, 85.
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Finally, there remains the question of a means to turn this method to
practical utility. Governmental reforms are not brought about merely
by encouraging the writing of books. They are generally achieved only
as the result of well planned and long sustained pressure brought to bear
upon those in control of affairs. Legislative reform of administration to
date has been the result largely of pressure brought to bear by the administrative itself, an efficient and continuous pressure, but not one necessarily
calculated to be in the best interests of the administrative process as a
whole. Each administrator, in seeking amendatory legislation, has in
mind chiefly the improvement of his own efficiency, and only secondarily,
if at all, the object of facilitating the attainment of the ends of the whole
body of law. What must be devised is some instrumentality, impartial
yet practical, of pressure to secure the enactment into law of principles and
rules designed to reach the end already mentioned: maximum security of
individual interests consistently with highest promotion of social interests.
To summarize briefly: The Committee on Administrative Law of the
American Bar Association is in a position, and is therefore subject to a
certain obligation, to enter upon a definite, systematic program looking to
the development of Administrative Law in this country along lines which
will best insure its being an effective and satisfactory instrument of justice. To that end, its program must be broad and far-seeing enough to
enable its members to look beyond subconscious prejudices and inculcated notions of an ideal simplicity of governmental structure. Facing
realities, they must recognize the existence of the administrative as a
permanent institution. They must recognize the fact of an accepted doctrine of judicial supremacy, and the further fact that at present, and not
without cause, the judiciary is distrustful of the administrative, with the
result that much administration is obstructed by an excess of judicial
supervision. They should cast about for some means of breaking down
this distrust by destroying its causes. The suggested fields of activity are:
1. Education of the bar to an understanding of public law objectives and
processes; 2. Improvement of administrative personnel; 3. Development of a technique of legislative control of the evolution of the administrative.

